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[O]f all the species of writer, bloggers are the least insulated from their
audience, most vulnerable to the ebb and flow of attention and response.
They are both alone and in a crowd. Their solitude can inspire self-
indulgent ranting; their sociability can tempt them into self-serving
pandering. But every now and then they manage to hold their balance in
this paradoxical position for an extended, exhilarating spell.'
L Introduction
The blog is a powerful outlet for expression that holds the potential
to reach an audience virtually unhindered by geographic and economic
1. SCOTT ROSENBERG, SAY EVERYTHING: How BLOGGING BEGAN, WHAT IT'S
BECOMING, AND WHY rr MATrERS 326 (2009).
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limits.2 With this power comes the ability to disseminate socially valuable
and productive speech and, conversely, speech with no apparent value.3
Some of the more controversial blog content has recently sparked litigation
in the field of employment law.4 Although private sector employees have
no First Amendment5 protection in connection with their employment,
public employees enjoy limited constitutional protection from adverse
employment actions.6  As the sheer number of individual bloggers
continues to increase, public employee blogging will increase as well.7
2. See GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: How MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY
EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE To BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER GOLIATHS
261 (2006) (explaining how "self-expression on any sizable scale was the limited province
of the rich and powerful" prior to recent advancements in technology which allow a person
to post artwork, books, and other forms of expression online "from anywhere and have them
available to the entire world").
3. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 305 (explaining computer-science pioneer
Joseph Weizenbaum's remarks discussing the value of content on the Internet). Rosenberg
repeated Weizenbaum's quote that was published in the New York Times and also included
the rest of Rosenberg's quote that was absent from the article:
Here, for instance, is one that is nearly perfect in its combination of vivid
imagery and disdain: "The Internet is like one of those garbage dumps outside
of Bombay. There are people, most unfortunately, crawling all over it, and
maybe they find a bit of aluminum, or perhaps something they can sell. But
mainly it's garbage. .. ." After the story quoting him appeared, Weizenbaumn
wrote a letter to the editor. He affirmed the quotation's accuracy but noted that
he'd gone on to say, "There are gold mines and pearls in there that a person
trained to design good questions can find."
Id. (citations omitted).
4. See, e.g., infra Part IV (discussing cases in which the government took retaliatory
action against an employee for the content of the employee's blog). A term-dooced-has
even been coined to refer to the act of being fired for one's blogging activities. See Jerome
P. Coleman, Employee Blogs: Recognizing the Reality, 762 PRACTICING L. INST. 561, 569
(Oct. 2007) ("Heather Armstrong, a web designer, was fired in 2001 for writing
,objectionable and negative' statements about her job, coworkers, and boss on her blog,
Dooce .... The blogging community now uses the term 'dooced' to mean having lost one's
job because of one's blogging activities.").
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (commanding that "Congress shall make no
law .. . abridging the freedom of speech").
6. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech,
FIRST REPORTS (First Amendment Center, Nashville, Tenn.), Dec. 2002, at 2, available at
http://www.firstamendmenteenter.org/PDF/FirstReport.PublicEmployees.PDF ("While the
private employer probably can fire an employee whose speech he dislikes, the First
Amendment governs the circumstances under which public employers may discipline
employees for their speech.").
7. See Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, When Private Sector Employer Fires
Worker for Blogging, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 2007, at 3 ("There are currently 63.2 million blogs in
existence and 175,000 new blogs are created every day.... Accordingly, as blogs continue
to rise in popularity, there have been several prominent instances where employees have
153
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Moreover, given the limited First Amendment protections of public
employees, the growing use of blogging by these employees will likely lead
to an increase in employment litigation regarding their online activities.8
To provide consistent application of the law and prevent unnecessary
chilling of speech, certain inconsistencies in the current test for establishing
the First Amendment rights of public employees must be addressed. The
current test for determining whether the government, as an employer, can
take disciplinary action against an employee for expressing his First
Amendment rights is embodied in the Pickering balancing test.9 Under this
test, a court balances the employee's interest, as a private citizen, to
exercise his First Amendment rights against the government's interest, as
an employer, to promote efficiency of government service.'0 The Court has
refined this test over the years by adding certain requirements and
standards." Despite those refinements, lower courts continue to apply
inconsistently parts of the balancing test."2 These inconsistencies
demonstrate a need for action by the Court or, alternatively, Congress to
ensure that the constitutional rights of public employees are adequately
protected. Although either body could choose to strengthen the protections
for all types of speech, this Note argues that blogging presents a unique
used their blogs to comment publicly about their employers." (citations omitted)).
8. See Michelle A. Todd et al., Employee Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Social Network
Sites, NAT'L SCH. BDS. Ass'N, Jan. 2008, http://www.nsba.org/SecondaryMenu/
COSA/SearchlAllCOSAdocuments/SocialNetworkSitesAO8.aspx (last visited Sept. 22,
2010) ("In 2006, the Employment Law Alliance surveyed over 1,000 American employees
and found that up to five percent maintained personal blogs. Of them, 16 percent admitted
to posting unfavorable comments about their employers, co-workers, supervisors, or
customers.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See MARCY S. EDWARDS, JILL LEKA, JAMES BAIRD & STEFANIE LEE BLACK,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE 29 (1998) (explaining that the Pickering
balancing test "remains the current standard" used to "address the free speech rights of
public employees").
10. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.").
11. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (limiting the scope of the
Pickering balancing test by holding that an employee's actions pursuant to his official duties
were not constitutionally protected); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (adding
the requirement that a public employee's speech must touch on a matter of public concern in
order to trigger Pickering balancing).
12. See infra Part III (discussing the inconsistent application of the "disruption to the
workplace prong" of the Pickering balancing test in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits).
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vulnerability under Pickering and requires a more certain disruption
standard.
This Note opens with an anecdotal example of public employee
blogging gone wrong based on a recent scandal set in the nation's capital.
Part 11 uses these facts to examine the evolution of the Pickering balancing
test in the Supreme Court, paying specific attention to the Court's
formulation of the "disruption to the workplace" rung of the test. Next, Part
III looks to various lower court formulations of the disruption rung and
specifically examines inconsistent formulations found within decisions of
the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits. Part V explores the specific application
of Pickering to lower court blogging cases and establishes the significant
impact that the disruption standard can have on blogging cases. Following
from this analysis, Part VI examines the negative effects of the inconsistent
disruption standard and, in turn, explores the benefits of creating a
consistent standard. Finally, this Note suggests that the stricter standard of
"actual disruption" must be effected by the Court or congressional action, at
least insofar as the off-duty blogging activities of government employees
are concerned. This action will be a positive step toward adequately
protecting the First Amendment rights of public employees and preventing
unnecessary chilling of this new and valuable form of expression.
II. A Rio gging Scandal Exposes the Uncertainties of the Pickering
Framework
While noncontroversial personal blogs about one's pets or other
mundane aspects of a person's life will rarely, if ever, result in discipline by
an employer, racier blogs, which focus on intimate sexual details of a
blogger's life or public criticism of the blogger's workplace, often do
trigger a strong reaction from employers who discover the entries."3 When
public employees create these types of controversial personal blogs, the line
defining First Amendment protections is often blurred. One recent instance
involves the blogging activities of Jessica Cutler, a congressional staffer on
Capitol Hill who was fired for content on her blog. 14 Cutler wrote a blog
13. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 569 (discussing employees who had been fired for
blogging including a flight attendant who had been 'fired for posting suggestive photographs
of herself in uniform on her blog").
14. See Richard Leiby, The Hill's Sex Diarist Reveals All (Well, Some), WASH. POST,
May 23, 2004, at D03 ("Sen. Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) on Friday fired a young staffer for
'unacceptable use of Senate computers' after she posted her sex diaries on the Internet and
raised a hubbub of speculation last week: Who is this wicked woman that calls herself
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chronicling her sexual escapades with high-level congressional staffers and
members of the Bush administration.'15  Instead of contesting her firing,
Cutler profited from the instant celebrity status arising from the scandal by
signing a book deal, among other benefits.'1
6
In light of her personal gain from the incident, Cutler never raised the
issue of her First Amendment rights as a government employee; however,
with a few slight adjustments to this fact pattern, Cutler's statements in her
blog would be subject to the balancing test enunciated in Pickering v.
Board of Education,'17 which determines whether a public employee's
'Washingtonienne'?").
15. See April Witt, Blog Interrupted, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2004, at W12 ("Jessica's
blog. ... was the online diary she had been posting anonymously to amuse herself and her
closest girlfriends. In it, she detailed the peccadilloes of the men she said were her six
current sexual partners, including a married Bush administration official. . . ."); see also id
("Jessica's blog identified [the men she blogged about] only by their initials. But amateur
Internet sleuths who read the blog searched electronic databases looking for likely suspects,
then posted names and photographs on the Internet. Jessica still refuses to name the men
publicly."); Wonkette, The Lost Washingtonienne (Wonkette Exclusive, Etc., Etc.),
WONKETrE, http://wonkette.com/4 162/the-lost-washingtonienne-wonkette-exclusive-etc-etc
(May 18, 2004, 6:32 PM) (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (reproducing Cutler's deleted
Washingtonienne blog) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Cutler
describes her "key" to identifying the men in her blog in the following entry:
By popular demand, I have finally created a key to keeping my sex life straight.
In alpha order: .. . X=Married man who pays me for sex. Chief of Staff at one
of the gov agencies, appointed by Bush .... HK=Dude from the Senate office I
jinterned in Jan. thru Feb. Hired me as an intern .... YZ=My new office bf
with whom I am embroiled in an office sex scandal.
Id.
16. See Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the
Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1195, 1195-96 (2006) ("When her blog was linked to by
the very popular political gossip blog Wonkette, Jessica gained instant celebrity. Her blog
was discussed in The Washington Post, The New York Times, and CNN. She posed for
Playboy and landed a book deal with a $300,000 advance.").
17. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that the
dismissal of a public school teacher for writing a letter to a newspaper criticizing past
policies of the Board was a violation of the teacher's First Amendment rights). In Pickering,
the Court addressed the issue of what extent public employees are protected from retaliatory
adverse employment action for exercise of their First Amendment rights. Id. at 565. Here, a
public school teacher, Pickering, was fired for sending a letter criticizing past policies of the
Board of Education to a local newspaper. Id at 564. The Court reasoned that "[tjhe
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at
568. After balancing the two interests, the Court concluded that Pickering's letter was of
high public concern and low disruption; and thus, he was wrongfuilly dismissed because the
content of his letter was protected by the First Amendment. Id at 572-74.
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speech is constitutionally protected by balancing the employee's interest
against the government's interest in promoting workplace efficiency.'18 An
analysis of Cutler's potential case elucidates some of the ambiguities that
complicate the application of this test. Although Cutler was fired for
misuse of government resources,' 9 she would have a legitimate First
Amendment claim if the facts were slightly altered so that all of her blog
entries were posted outside of work when she was not on duty. Under these
facts, an analysis of Cutler's case provides a clear picture of how the
current test works and the current doctrine's weaknesses.
A. Cutler's Blog Entries Satisfy the "Not Pursuant to Official Duty"
Requirement
Subsequent to the Pickering decision, the Supreme Court refined the
balancing test by limiting its application to cases where two threshold
requirements are first satisfied-both of which Cutler's blog fulfills.20 In
the 2006 Supreme Court case, Garcetti v. Ceballos,' the Court added the
"1not pursuant to official duties" threshold to the Pickering analysis. Under
this threshold, speech made pursuant to a government employee's official
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the Pickering balancing
test).
19. See Leiby, supra note 14, at D03 (explaining that Cutler was fired for
"unacceptable use of Senate computers" and that her supervisor, Sen. Mike DeWine, said
that Cutler "had used Senate 'resources and work time to post unsuitable and offensive
material to an Internet Web log"').
20. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-26 (2006) (applying the Pickering
analysis to determine that the appellant's actions pursuant to his official duties were not
protected by the First Amendment); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (applying
the Pickering analysis to determine that the appellant's action of distributing an internal
questionnaire that did not present a matter of public concern was not protected speech).
21. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding that public employee statements made
pursuant to one's official duties are not protected by the First Amendment). In Garcetti, the
Court addressed the issue of whether speech made pursuant to one's official duties had the
same protections as private speech under the Pickering balancing test. Id. at 421. In this
case, Ceballos, a deputy district attorney, determined that an affidavit in a pending case
contained misrepresentations, which prompted him to send a memo to his supervisors
recommending dismissal of the case. Id. at 420. Ceballos claimed that his First Amendment
rights had been violated when he was then subjected to retaliatory adverse employment
actions because of the memo regarding the misrepresentations. Id. at 415. The Court
reasoned that restricting speech that is pursuant to one's official duties does not infringe any
First Amendment rights that the employee holds as a private citizen and thus, is not
protected speech under the Pickering balancing test. Id. at 42 1-22.
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duties is not protected by the First Amendment. 2 The Court established
this threshold to ensure that the government, as an employer, has the ability
to control effectively a public employee's official responsibilities.
Although what constitutes "pursuant to one's official duties" is unclear in
certain contexts,2 Cutler's personal blog discussing her various
relationships and affairs is distinct from the official duties associated with
her position as a staff assistant .2 Thus, Cutler's speech would meet the
Garcetti threshold.
B. Cutler's Speech Satisfies the Public Concern Requirement
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers 26ade th
requirement that-before triggering the Pickering analysis-speech must
22. See id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees -are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.").
23. See id at 421-22 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might
have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over
what the employer itself has commissioned or created.").
24. See Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First
Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 Ky. L.J. 37, 44 (2008) (discussing lower
court cases in which a "key issue was what constitutes the scope of employment for purposes
of applying Garcetti").
25. See Witt, supra note 15, at W12 ("Jessica tried opening and sorting mail. That's
what she was paid to do as a staff assistant for Sen. Mike DeWine, a Republican from
Ohio.").
26. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (finding that "Myers's
questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense" and thus,
her discharge "did not offend the First Amendment"). In Connick, the main issue was
whether the public concern requirement in Pickering had been satisfied. Id. at 142. Myers,
an assistant district attorney, was notified of a proposed office transfer. Id. at 140. Strongly
opposed to this transfer, Myers created a questionnaire soliciting the views of her fellow
staff members concerning office transfer policy. Id. at 141. Immediately after distributing
the questionnaire to her co-workers, Myers was terminated for refuising to accept the
transfer. Id. The Court reasoned that "[wihen employee expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id at 146. The Court then
determined that all of the questions on the questionnaire that did not touch on a matter of
public concern were not protected speech in the public employment context. Id. at 148. For
the one question that did touch on a matter of public concern, the Court applied the
balancing test and found that the questionnaire was not protected. Id. at 153.
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touch on a matter of public concern.2 This is one of the more ambiguous
prongs of the test, in that the standards defining "public concern" set by the
Court are vague.2 Although her speech less clearly implicates this second
threshold, Cutler's blog satisfies the public concern requirement under a
broader interpretation.2 Under a purely literal definition of public concern,
a strong argument exists that a person's intimate sexual encounters are
"1matters only of personal interest," which the Court determined would not
30
be protected by the First Amendment. On the other hand, a broader
27. See id at 146 ("Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude that if
Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of
public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.').
28. See Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U.
CoLo. L. Rcv. 1101, 1109 (2008) [hereinafter Secunda Whither] (describing the various
Supreme Court formulations of the "public concern" requirement). Secunda explained:
Under Connick v. Myers, courts are directed to look at the surrounding content,
form, and context of the speech to see if the speech involves a matter of public
concern. This type of speech 'typically [includes] matters concerning
government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which
public employees are uniquely qualified to comment.' Sometimes courts ask
whether the speech addresses a 'matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community,' or is worthy of legitimate news interest. If the court determines
that the speech merely involved purely private interest, like an employment
dispute with one's supervisors, then there is no First Amendment protection for
the speech, because it does not implicate the core concerns of the First
Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. See EDWARDS, LEKA, BAIRD & BLACK, supra note 9, at 55-56 (discussing the
broader reading of the public concern requirement in a Seventh Circuit case, Eberhardt v.
O 'Malley). The authors pointed out the Seventh Circuit's explanation that "'[ut is not the
case that the only expression which the First Amendment protects is expression that deals
with matters of public concern, unless this formula is understood to mean any matter for
which there is potentially a public."' Id. (quoting Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 17 F.3d 1023,
1025 (7th Cir. 1994)).
30. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (holding that "[w]hen a public employee speaks ...
as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum" to review the personnel actions
of that public employer). But see EDWARDS, LEKA, BMRD & BLACK, supra note 9, at 56
(noting that the public concern requirement is relevant to private work-related grievance and
not necessarily nonwork-related speech). The authors note:
If an employee speaks regarding a private work-related grievance, such as
promotions, hours, or pay, courts must determine if the speech is truly personal
or if, instead, it addresses a matter of public concern, such as corruption or
waste. When an employee's speech goes beyond addressing a private work-
related grievance, courts will require the employer to put forth some sort of
justification.
Id. Although connected to the workplace, in that her sexual partners were co-workers.
Cutler's blog does not appear to be airing any work-related grievances, as contemplated
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16067 WASH. &LEE L. REV J15](2010)
construction of the public concern requirement would include these
personal descriptions. 31  Regardless of how broadly the definition of public
concern is read, Cutler's descriptions of "supplementing" her income
through her relationships with congressional staffers could satisfy' even a
literal interpretation, in that some of these acts may have the potential to be
criminal or reveal corrupt employment practices in Congress.3 In light of
the potential matters of public concern and the broader interpretations of
this threshold, this Note presumes that Cutler's speech passes the public
concern threshold.3 With the two initial thresholds satisfied, the next step
is to apply the heart of Pickering by balancing the competing parties'
interests.3
C Balancing Interests in Cutler's Case Reveals Uncertainties
Balancing Cutler's free speech interest against the government's
efficiency interest reveals the uncertainties associated with determining
their relative weights. In Pickering, the Court recognized that First
Amendment rights of public employees must be considered concurrently
with the government's interest in promoting efficient public service.3
above.
31. See, e.g., EDWARDS, LEKA, BAIRD & BLACK, supra note 9, at 55 (discussing the
extreme example of disciplining an employee for speaking with a friend about lawn care
while off-duty to point out the "difficulty with strictly adhering to Connick's public concern
requirement'). The authors pointed out that "[c]ourts are, accordingly, reluctant to allow
employers to discipline employees for speech, even speech of little or no public concern, if
the employer cannot articulate some justification." Id.
32. See Wonkette, supra note 15 (reprinting Cutler's blog). Cutler's following blog
entry would touch on a matter of public concern if true:
Most of my living expenses are thankfully subsidized by a few generous older
gentlemen. I'm sure I am not the only one who makes money on the side this
way: how can anybody live on $25K/year?? If you investigated every Staff Ass
on the Hill, I am sure you would find out some freaky shit. No way can
anybody live on such a low salary. I am convinced that the Congressional
offices are full of dealers and hos.
Id
33. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 2 SMOLLA & NIMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 18:10, at
18-34.1 (2010) [hereinafter SMOLLA 2] ("It is a simpler matter, in many instances, to err on
the side of classifying speech that is in this 'hybrid' category as speech on matters of public
concern, and then to concentrate on the more palpable question of disruption.").
34. See Secunda Whither, supra note 28, at 1109 ("[I]f the speech relates to a matter of
public concern not connected to a public employee's official duties, a court then undertakes
a Pickering balance of interests test.").
35. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("At the same time it
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Addressing the tension between these two interests, the Court announced a
balancing test that weighs the interest of the public employee, "as a citizen,
commenting on matters of public concern" and the interest of the "State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."06 The application of this balancing test to Cutler's
situation exposes the main ambiguities at issue in this Note-specifically,
the formulation of the "disruption to the workplace" standard.3
1. Public Employee's Interest in Freedom of Expression: Cutler's Speech
Does Not Deserve Substantial Protection
In Cutler's case, the first step is to determine the weight to be afforded
to her blog entries under First Amendment principles .38  The value of
Cutler's speech depends to some extent on the degree that her speech
touches on a matter of public concern.3 Courts assign greater weight to an
individual's speech that addresses substantial issues of public concern and
lesser weight to issues that only tangentially touch on these important
issues. Unless a court finds that Cutler's blog exposes a practice of
employment corruption in the federal government or touches on some other
important matter of public concern, a court likely will not afford Cutler's
interests great weight under the First Amendment.4
cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general.").
3 6. Id.
37. See infra Part III (discussing the varying interpretations of the 'disruption to the
workplace" rung within the Eighth and Ninth Circuits).
38. See EDwARD, LEKA, BAIRD & BLACK, supra note 9, at 31 ("Hence, the Court held
that only after balancing the relative importance of each party's interests can one determine
if the Constitution protects the speech.").
39. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138. 152 (1983) ("We caution that a stronger
showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of
public concern."); see also SMOLLA 2, supra note 33, § 18:18, at 18-54.6 ("[T]he state's
burden in justifyuing the regulation varies according to the nature of the employee's
expression. The greater the component of comment on issues of public concemn, the greater
the showing the government must make that the comment is disruptive." (citations omitted)).
40. See SMOLLA 2, supra note 33, § 18: 10, at 18-34.9-34. 10 (quoting Justice Powell's
beliefs about the extra weight given to speech involving matters of public concern as
opposed to matters of purely private concern). Smolla summarizes Justice Powell's opinion:
Writing for a plurality, Justice Powell observed that "[wie have long recognized
that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance," Powell stated that
speech "on matters of public concern" is at the heart of the First Amendment,
161
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2. Government's Interest as Employer: Cutler's First Amendment
Protection Depends on the Disruption Standard Applied
Even assuming that Cutler's speech will not be given substantial
weight in the balancing, she prevails if the government's interest does not
outweigh her First Amendment interest.4 ' As guidance for determining the
governmental interest that led to Cutler's firing, federal courts have
announced various factors to apply including:
whether the speech would create problems in maintaining discipline or
harmony among co-workers, whether the employment relationship is
one in which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, whether the
speech impeded the employee's ability to perform his or her
responsibilities, the time, place and manner of the speech, the context in
which the underlying dispute arose, whether the matter was one on
which debate was vital to informed decisionmaking, and whether the
speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public.42
Because Cutler's dismissal was almost simultaneous with the discovery of
her blog, it is highly unlikely that any actual disruption to the workplace
occurred prior to her dismissal.4 Disruption to the workplace is one of the
unsettled standards, and the lower courts disagree whether an employee's
speech must cause actual disruption or whether it need only suggest
potential or likely disruption."4 Whether disruption hinges on finding an
which "was fashioned to ensure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social change." "Speech on matters of purely private
concern," Justice Powell wrote, "is of less First Amendment concern."
Id (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59
(1985)).
41. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (plurality opinion) (restating
the balancing test). In a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote:
To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the
employee's interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed
by any injury the speech could cause to 'the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.'
Id. (citations omitted); see also SMOLLA 2, supra note 33, § 18:16, at 18-54 ("[O]nce speech
is deemed to be a matter of public concern, the second step of the inquiry is to determine if
the injury to the government caused by the speech outweighs the employee's interest in free
expression.").
42. SMOLLA 2, supra note 33, § 18:17, at 18-54.3-54.4 (citations omitted).
43. See Witt, supra note 15, at W12 (describing the events from the publication of
Cutler's blog on Wonkette up to Cutler's firing).
44. See infra Part IHI (discussing the inconsistencies in the Eighth and Ninth Circuit
approaches to the disruption prong).
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actual hindrance to the efficiency of the workplace or whether a mere
potential to cause disruption is sufficient can have serious consequences in
many situations-including Cutler's case.4
A brief look at the phrasing of the disruption standard within Supreme
Court cases developing the Pickering framework sheds light on one source
of the confusion in the test's application. The Pickering Court seems to
require a showing of actual disruption.4 In Connick, the Court found that
the line between actual and potential disruption was inextricably
intertwined in the public concern part of the balancing test.47 The Court
found that a showing closer to actual disruption is needed for cases in
which the speech more substantially involves matters of public concern,
and a lesser showing is required for cases where the speech expresses a less
significant public concern.4 A decade later, the plurality in Waters v.
Churchill,49 discussed standards of "reasonable predictions of disruption"50
and "'potential disruptiveness"~ even though the disruption standard was
45. Compare Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
Nunez's speech was protected by the First Amendment and not outweighed by the claim by
the employer that Nunez's speech 'impaired his 'close working relationship"' with her by
applying the standard that "real, not imagined, disruption is required"), with Dible v. City of
Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the government could discipline
Dible for his speech without violating his First Amendment rights by applying the "potential
for disruption" standard).
46. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (exonerating
Pickering after determining that his statements had "neither shown nor c[ould] be presumed
to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the
classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally").
47. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) ("[T~he state's burden in
justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's
expression. Although such particularized balancing is difficult, the courts must reach the
most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.").
48. See id. at 152 (discussing the varying levels of disruption depending on the extent
to which speech touches on a matter of public concern). The Court reasoned:
Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to
unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of
working relationships is manifest before taking action. We caution that a
stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially
involved matters of public concern.
Id. (citations omitted).
49. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677 (1994) (plurality opinion) (finding that
the Connick test should be applied to what the government reasonably thought was said and
not only to what a trier of fact ultimately determines was said).
50. See id. at 673 ("But we have given substantial weight to government employers'
reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public
concern, and even though when the government is acting as sovereign our review of
legislative predictions of harm is considerably less deferential.").
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nondispositive. In 2006, the Court in Garcetti referenced a potential
disruption standard; however, the Court ultimately found the disruption
standard nondispositive because the employee was acting pursuant to his official
duties. The Supreme Court's apparent confusion regarding the disruption
standard, as displayed by these cases, has led to varying interpretations by the
lower courts.5
Cutler's situation highlights why uncertainty over the disruption standard
matters-particularly in the case of off-duty blogging. Cutler can make a
legitimate argument that the government has not met its burden of proving actual
disruption. 54 However, if a court applies the potential disruption standard, the
government will have a much stronger case that the disruption standard has been
satisfied."5 The content of blog entries is uniquely affected by the differing
standards of disruption partly due to the personal nature of blogging. 16 Cutler
claims she only intended for the blog to be seen by her close friends as a shortcut
to email.5 As evidence of this intention, she immediately deleted her entire blog
51. See id. at 681 ("As a matter of law, this potential disruptiveness was enough to
outweigh whatever First Amendment value the speech might have had.").
52. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (explaining that the question
was "whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general public" and stating that the
"1restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the
entity's operations").
53. See, e.g., infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting views
about the disruption standard demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit through the original and
amended opinions of Richerson v. Beckon).
54. See Witt, supra note 15, at W12 (explaining that Cutler was fired almost
immediately after her blog was published on Wonkette). This nearly instant reaction to the
publication of Cutler's blog suggests that, even if the content of her blog was likely to cause
disruption to the workplace, Cutler was fired before there was any opportunity for disruption
to occur; thus, her blog could not have caused actual disruption in the workplace related to
Cutler's employment because she was no longer employed.
55. See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) ("And
although the government's justification cannot be mere speculation, it is entitled to rely on
,reasonable predictions of disruption."'). In this case, the government could make a strong
argument that Cutler's firing was in reaction to a reasonable prediction that the news of this
blog would cause disruption in the form of workplace disharmony and distrust, whereas the
timing of the firing would prevent the government from applying the same reasons to prove
actual disruption.
56. See Paul M. Secunda, Blogging While (Publicly) Employed Some First
Amendment Implications, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. Rnv. 679, 690-91 [hereinafter Secunda
Blogging] ("[Tihe combination of City of San Diego and Richerson suggests that public
employee bloggers might have the hardest time finding First Amendment speech protection
under Connick's public concern test, given the personal nature of many blog postings.").
57. See Witt, supra note 15, at W12 ("Jessica's blog (short for 'Web log') was the
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once she was informed that it had been published on Wonkette.5 Cutler's
intentions suggest that her blog very likely would have caused no disruption or
even had the potential to disrupt if not for the Wonkette publication. In instances
such as these, the Court-by requiring actual disruption-will provide a needed
and valuable added protection to the First Amendment rights of public
employees to express themselves.59
117, Lower Court Inconsistencies: The Disruption Standard Is Not Articulated
Uniformly
As the story of Jessica Cutler's blog reveals, the slight semantic distinctions
between actual and potential disruption have a significant effect on the final
disposition of a case-especially in the context of blogS. 60 Although the number
of public employment blogging cases in the lower courts is small, an examination
of the disruption standard across the broad spectrum of Pickering balancing cases
in the lower courts reveals a general sense of confusion over how disruption
should be formulated. An exploration of the intra-circuit inconsistencies
demonstrates the need for a consistent standard. Because of the greater impact
that this standard can have on off-duty blogging as opposed to more traditional
forms of speech, a more consistent standard should be adopted for blogging.
A. Eighth Circuit: Conflicting Disruption Standards Exist
When articulating the disruption standard of the Pickering balancing test
the Eighth Circuit cases mention the similar disruption factors set out in Shands
online diary she had been posting anonymously to amuse herself and her closest
girlfriends.").
58. See id. (discussing how Cutler immediately deleted her blog after being notified of
its publication on Wonkette). April Witt explained Cutler's thought patterns at the time by
writing:
The messages warning Jessica that her private little joke had just gone very
public came from a girlfriend over on the House side. Reading it, Jessica says,
she was too stunned to wonder how Wonkette had discovered her blog. Instead,
the portion of Jessica's brain that had evolved to help humans survive
marauding mastodons screamed: Kill the blog! Kill the blog!
Id. This instinctual reaction to delete the blog indicates that Cutler did not intend for this
information to be fully public.
59. See infra note 199 (discussing the chilling effect associated with the uncertainties
of balancing tests).
60. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing Cutler's likely
outcomes depending on whether actual or potential disruption is applied).
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v. City of Kennet51 as a starting point for analysis.6 The analysis flowing from
these factors, however, diverges into two inconsistent standards. One line of
cases requires the government to prove actual disruption63 while another allows
for a lesser showing.64
I. Cases Requiring a Showing ofActual Disruption
Calling for more than mere allegations of disruption, one line of
Eighth Circuit cases places a higher burden on the government by requiring
a showing of actual disruption to the workplace.6 In Kincade v. City of
61. See Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1346 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
"the Pickering balance favor[ed] defendants" and that "plaintiffs' speech, under the facts of
this case, was not protected by the First Amendment").
62. See id. at 1344 (discussing the six factors used to evaluate the public employer's
interest in the Pickering balancing test); see, e.g., Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d
389, 397 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing the Shands factors); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 971 (8th
Cir. 1995) (referring to the Shands factors). Note that even though Kincade requires actual
disruption and Tindle requires less than actual disruption, both cases begin by announcing
the Shands factors. See infra Part III.A. 1-2 (discussing the Eighth Circuit cases requiring
actual disruption and those requiring less than actual disruption). Circuit Judge Woliman
announced the factors in Shands:
In balancing an employee's and an employer's competing interests, we weigh
six interrelated factors: (1) the need for harmony in the office or work place;
(2) whether the government's responsibilities require a close working
relationship to exist between the plaintiff and co-workers when the speech in
question has caused or could cause the relationship to deteriorate; (3) the time,
manner, and place of the speech; (4) the context in which the dispute arose;
(5) the degree of public interest in the speech; and (6) whether the speech
impeded the employee's ability to perform his or her duties.
Shands, 993 F.2d at 1344 (citations omitted).
63. See infra Part III.A. 1 (discussing Eighth Circuit cases requiring a showing of
actual disruption).
64. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing Eighth Circuit cases requiring less than actual
disruption).
65. See, e.g., Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that
to trigger Pickering balancing, a government employer "must, with specificity, demonstrate
the speech at issue created workplace disharmony, impeded the plaintiffs performance or
impaired working conditions"); Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d 941, 949 (8th Cir.
2007) ("Although law enforcement predictions of disruption are due some deference, the
Pickering balancing test only need be conducted if a government employer has produced
evidence of workplace disruption."); Washington v. Normandy Fire Prot. Dist., 272 F.3d
522, 526 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The Pickering balancing test is applicable, however, only if it is
first established that the speech in question created a disruption in the workplace."
(emphasis added)); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the inability of the City to meet its burden of disruption). The Court reasoned:
The Appellants' argument is largely based on bare allegations that the speech
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Blue Springs, 66 Ronald Kincade was hired as the Engineer and Director of
Public Works for Blue Springs, Missouri .6 ' Kincade authored a status
report regarding the structural integrity of a city dam. 68 Terminated by the
Board shortly after delivering this report, Kincade claimed that his firing
was in retaliation for his comments warning the Board about the dam's
structural dangers .69 Addressing the issue of whether Kincade's speech was
constitutionally protected, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the City failed to
produce sufficient evidence to trigger Pickering balancing.7
In making this finding, the Eighth Circuit noted that "the primary
focus of the City's interest element is to determine whether the speech
undermines 'the effective functioning of the public employer's
entrprse.0 'After evaluating the City's allegations, the court found that
the City "failed to provide even a scintilla of evidence that
Kincade's. ... statements caused disharmony in the workplace, impaired his
ability to perform his duties, or impaired his working relationships with
other employees."7
caused the City problems; the Appellants have not produced more than minimal
specific evidence to support these assertions.... The Appellants have failed to
provide even a scintilla of evidence that Kincade's August 5 statements caused
disharmony in the workplace, impaired his ability to perform his duties, or
impaired his working relationships with other employees. Therefore, the district
court properly declined to conduct the Pickering balancing test.
Id. at 398.
66. See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 398 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
that "the district court properly declined to conduct the Pickering balancing test").
67. See id at 392 ("On June 4, 1990, Ronald Kincade was hired as the
Engineer/Director of Public Works for Blue Springs, Missouri (City).").
68. See id. ("On August 5, 1991, Kincade gave a verbal status report on the
assignment [about the structural integrity of a dam] to the... [Board of Alderman. . .. The
comments Kincade made during this verbal status report are the subject of this appeal.").
69. See id. at 393 (explaining various safety and legal issues that Kincade raised with
respect to the dam and his belief that these statements were the cause of his termination).
70. See id. at 398 (finding that "the district court properly declined to conduct the
Pickering balancing test"). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's reasoning
that "it was impossible to balance Kincade's interest in making the speech because the City
produced no evidence to support its assertions." Id. at 397.
71. Id (citations omitted). The court also reiterated the City's burden of proving
actual disruption while discussing the government interest prong of Pickering in the context
of the qualified immunity claims. See id at 398 ("[Ilt is critical to determine whether the
defendants have put the Pickering balancing test at issue by producing evidence that the
speech activity had an adverse effect on the efficiency of the public employer's
operations.").
72. Id. at 398.
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The totality of the language in Kincade and similar cases suggests that
the Eighth Circuit requires the government to show actual disruption.~
These cases fail to recognize that potential disruption is sufficient to trigger
Pickering balancing-instead requiring the more concrete standard of
proving that the speech actually caused disruption, impairment, or a general
hindrance to the workplace.7
It is important to note that this more concrete depiction of disruption is
most commonly articulated in Eighth Circuit cases in which the court is
reviewing lower court rulings on motions for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity."5 Although the court in Kincade had pendent appellate
jurisdiction to review the merits of the First Amendment claim,7 6 many of
the Eighth Circuit cases articulating this standard discuss the Pickering
balancing test solely in connection with the merits of a government
official's qualified immunity claim.7 Nevertheless, the same test applies to
the employee's First Amendment protection claim and the qualified
immunity claim; thus, the standards dictated by the court do not vary
depending on the claims.7
73. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (describing the various articulations
of the disruption standard in Kincade); supra note 65 (discussing other Eighth Circuit cases
that require actual disruption).
74. Compare Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389. 397 (8th Cir. 1995) (using
statements requiring a concrete finding such as "whether the speech creates ..
undermines .. , impedes ... or impairs"), with Porter v. Dawson, 150 F.3d 887, 893 (8th Cir.
1998) (using conditional statements regarding the disruption standard such as "caused or
could cause the relationship to deteriorate").
75. See Lindsey v. City of Qrrick, 491 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Taylor appeals
arguing the district court erred in finding she was not entitled to qualified immunity.");
Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Fletcher and O'Hara
appeal from the order denying them qualified immunity; the county also seeks to appeal.");
Washington v. Normandy Fire Prot. Dist., 272 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2001) ("In this civil
rights action, Brian G. Quinlisk, Roy W. Kessler, and Robert J. Lee (collectively, the
directors) appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity."). Each of these cases purported to apply the actual disruption
standard. See cases cited supra note 65 (demonstrating how these cases applied an actual
disruption standard).
76. See Kincade, 64 F.3d at 395 (finding pendent appellate jurisdiction to hear the
City's claim that "Kincade's ... speech is not constitutionally protected because the claims
are 'inextricably intertwined' with their qualified immunity arguments").
77. See cases cited supra note 75 (presenting qualified immunity cases in which the
Eighth Circuit required an actual disruption standard).
78. See Kincade, 64 F.3d at 395 ("Both issues [claim of qualified immunity and claim
of constitutionally protected speech] require application of the same constitutional test.").
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2. Cases Requiring Less than Actual Disruption
In contrast to the cases in Part III.A. 1, other cases originating in the
Eighth Circuit place a lesser burden on the government by finding potential
disruption sufficient to trigger Pickering balancing.7 In Tindle v.
Caudell,80 the Eighth Circuit responded to the lack of actual disruption by
explaining that "a showing of actual disruption is not always required in the
balancing process under Pickering.",8 1 The court went on to explain that a
"reasonable prediction of disruption is entitled to substantial weight" in the
balancing process.8 With these statements, the court concedes that
Pickering balancing will be applied even absent proof of actual disruption.
This stance is squarely in conflict with the cases in Part III.A. 1 which
require a public employer to demonstrate "with specificity. . . [that] the
speech at issue created workplace disharmony, impeded the plaintiff's
performance or impaired working relationships. 8
3. General Trends and Analysis from Eighth Circuit Cases
An analysis of the cases discussed in this Part reveals that the court
tends to find consistently for the employee or the employer depending on
the disruption standard applied. In the cases examined that required a
showing of actual disruption, the employee prevailed.8 When the court
79. See, e.g., Bailey v. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 521
(8th Cir. 2006) ("[Iun determining whether particular speech caused disruption in the
workplace and therefore is not protected, we have held '[elvidence of actual disruption ..
is not required in all cases."'); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1995) (refuiting
Tindle's claim that a showing of actual disruption was required); Gordon v. City of Kansas
City, No. 98-0951-CV-W, 1999 WL 33453793, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 1999) (finding that
"a showing of actual disruption is not always required" and noting that "a government
employer's reasonable prediction of disruption is entitled to substantial weight" (citations
omnitted)).
80. See Tindle, 56 F.3d at 973 (holding that Tindle had "not made the requisite
showing to avoid summary judgment in defendants' favor").
8 1. Id. at 972.
82. See id. (citations omitted).
83. Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2007).
84. See id at 901 (holding that the government "has not alleged sufficient disruption
to trigger Pickering"); Shockency v. Ramsey County, 493 F.3d 941, 948 (8th Cur. 2007)
(holding that "Fletcher retaliated against Moore and Shockency for their First Amendment
conduct"); Washington v. Normandy Fire Prot. Dist., 272 F.3d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that "[b~ecause the directors' showing of actual or potential disruption is
insufficient to trigger the Pickering balancing test, their claim of qualified immunity fails");
Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 398 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the City had
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minimized the government's burden of disruption by allowing potential
disruption to trigger balancing, however, the public employer prevailed."5
Although many factors play a role in the ultimate result of each case, the
general trend correlating the disruption standard with the prevailing party
invokes the basic notion that deference and burdens play a significant role
in litigation.8 Intuitively, the party with the greater burden will have more
to overcome to prevail on the claim.87 In terms of the theories underlying
the First Amendment, this single favor given to one party can have a
significant impact on the level of protection given to public employees, and
in turn, the furtherance of those theories. 8
8
B. Ninth Circuit: Inconsistent Formulations of the Disruption Standard
Are Present
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit cases can be divided into
two separate lines regarding the disruption standard-cases requiring actual
disruption and cases requiring less than actual disruption." n ae
not "put the Pickering balancing test at issue' because the City "merely asserted" disruption
"without presenting any specific evidence to support" the assertions). The Eighth Circuit
required a showing of actual disruption in each of these cases. See cases cited supra note 65
(discussing the actual disruption standard in Lindsey, Shockency, Washington, and Kincade).
85. See Bailey v. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 522 (8th Cir.
2006) (holding that "the Pickering balancing test weighs in favor of" the Department of
Elementary & Secondary Education); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 973 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that Tindle did not "make the requisite showing to avoid summary judgment" in the
police department's favor); Gordon v. City of Kansas City, No. 98-095 1-CV-W, 1999 WL
33453793, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 1999) (holding that the factors in the case "tip the scale
in favor of the government as an employer"). These cases each required less than actual
disruption to trigger Pickering balancing. See cases cited supra note 79 (discussing the
disruption standard in Bailey, Tindle, and Gordon).
86. See SMOLLA 2, supra note 33, § 18:8, at 18-27 (discussing Waters v. Churchill in
the context of the Pickering balancing test and noting that the case "appeared to set a tone of
greater deference to government decision makng ... on the disruptive effect of the speech
in those instances in which it is of public concern").
87. Cf Elizabeth Mertz, Comment, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom:
Protection for Institution or Individual?, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 492, 500 (1988) ("Allowing one
fact to be presumed or inferred once another has been proven lightens the burden on the
party trying to prove the presumed or inferred fact."). In a similar manner, by deferring to
the government's predictions of disruption as opposed to requiring an actual showing, this
deference lightens the burden on the government.
88. See infra Part V.A (discussing how blogging uniquely serves the classic theories
underlying the First Amendment); see also Mertz, supra note 87, at 519-21 (discussing the
various policy reasons for protecting free speech).
89. See infra Part III.B. 1 (discussing Ninth Circuit cases requiring a showing of actual
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Richerson v. Beckon, 90 particularly demonstrates the intra-circuit conflict
regarding this standard. Part IV.B of this Note examines Richerson in-
depth and explores the court's conflict over the proper disruption standard
as played out in the initial and amended opinions written by the Ninth
Circuit.91
1. Cases Requiring a Showing ofActual Disruption
In one formulation of the disruption standard, a line of cases in the
Ninth Circuit requires a finding of actual disruption using language such as
"real, not imagined, disruption" to convey this requirement.9
Representative of these cases, the Ninth Circuit in Nunez v. Davis, 3 applied
this standard in the context of determining whether a "close working
relationship" between a municipal court judge and his court administrator
had been impaired as a result of the court administrator's speech at issue. 9
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that this standard ensures that a public
employer's claim of disruption cannot be used as a vehicle for silencing an
employee out of personal animus toward that employee.95 Although not
disruption); infra Part 1lI.B.2 (discussing Ninth Circuit cases requiring less than actual
disruption).
90. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 Fed. App'x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that
"the district court did not err in concluding that the legitimate administrative interests of the
School District outweighed Richerson's First Amendment interests in not being transferred
because of her speech").
91. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing the original and
amended Ninth Circuit opinions in Richerson v. Beckon).
92. Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting McKinley v. City of
Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1115
("However, real, not imagined, disruption is required, and the 'close working relationship'
exception cannot serve as a pretext for stifling legitimate speech or penalizing public
employees for expressing unpopular views."); Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d
503, 515 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that "[t]he administrators who testified also failed to show
that Settlegoode's letter was unusually disruptive or caused actual injury").
93. See Nunez, 169 F.3d at 1229 (finding that "Nunez's expressive conduct of
allowing the court clerks to attend the training seminar is. ... constitutionally protected under
the Pickering balancing test").
94. See id. (requiring that the "real, not imagined, disruption" standard apply to
Davis's argument that "Nunez's speech impaired his 'close working relationship' with
Nunez").
95. See id (discussing the importance of finding real and not imagined disruption to
the workplace). The Ninth Circuit reasoned:
As this court has previously stated, "real, not imagined, disruption is required,
and the 'close working relationship' exception cannot serve as a pretext for
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explicitly requiring actual disruption, this call for more than an imagined
sense of inefficiency or harm requires something more concrete.9 In
Nunez, the court administrator protested her judge's policy of only allowing
employees who had worked on the judge's reelection campaign to attend
training seminars by arranging for two clerks who had not worked on the
campaign to attend a seminar. 97  The judge fired the court administrator,
alleging that the absence of the clerks from court during the training
seminars disrupted the office routine and that the administrator's speech
contravening the judge's policy impaired his close working relationship
with her.9 Finding that these allegations did not constitute credible
evidence of disruption, the Ninth Circuit held that the court administrator's
expressive conduct was protected under the Pickering balancing test.99
Within the cases following this line, Pickering balancing will not be
triggered absent evidence of real disruption to the public employer.' 00
stifling legitimate speech by penalizing public employees for expressing
unpopular views." A public employer cannot claim disruption of a close
personal relationship to cover up animus toward an employee's speech and a
desire to silence the employee.
Id. (quoting McKinley v, City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1 110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)).
96. See id (determining that allegations of an eroded relationship did not constitute
"credible evidence to tip the scales in [the public employer's] favor").
97. See id at 1226 (explaining that "Nunez arranged for two court clerks who did not
work in Davis's reelection campaign to attend a training seminar" in protest of Judge
Davis's instruction "to limit attendees at training seminars to those court employees who had
worked in his reelection campaign").
98. See id at 1229 ("Davis testified that the absence of the clerks for two days to
attend the training seminar disrupted officer routine and exacerbated the court's
backlog .... Davis also argue[d] that Nunez's speech impaired his 'close working
relationship' with Nunez." (citations omitted)).
99. See id (discussing the lack of credible evidence to support Judge Davis's interest
in promoting government efficiency). The Ninth Circuit noted:
In short, Davis has offered no credible evidence to tip the scales in his favor, and
thus has failed to demonstrate a state interest that outweighs Nunez's First
Amendment rights. Nunez's expressive conduct of allowing the court clerks to
attend the training seminar is therefore constitutionally protected under the
Pickering balancing test.
Id.
100. See id. at 1229-30 (explaining that "there were no factors weighing in Davis's
favor" because "[t]he jury found Davis's testimony of office disruption not credible"); see
also McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1 110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the "real,
not imagined, disruption" requirement).
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2. Cases Requiring Less than Actual Disruption
Contrary to the line of Ninth Circuit cases requiring evidence of actual
disruption to trigger Pickering balancing, 10' other Ninth Circuit cases
recognize that "reasonable predictions of disruption" are sufficient to trigger
the interest balancing.102  In Brewster v. Board of Education, 103 Brewster,
an elementary school teacher, claimed that his nonrenewal by the Board
was a violation of his First Amendments rights.'04 Brewster claimed his
nonrenewal was in retaliation for expressing concerns to his superior that
his classroom attendance records had been falsified.1'0 To analyze whether
Brewster's First Amendment rights had been violated, the Ninth Circuit
first applied the traditional thresholds associated with the Pickering
balancing test. 16After finding that the public concern and official duty
thresholds were satisfied, the court explained the government interest prong
of the balancing test, noting that "courts must give government employers
'wide discretion and control over the management of [their] personnel and
internal affairs."' 107 In contrast to the real, not imagined, standard,' 08 the
Ninth Circuit in Brewster explicitly stated that government employers
101. See supra Part 11.B.1 (discussing the real, not imagined, disruption standard in a
line of Ninth Circuit cases).
102. Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion)). See also Dible v. City of Chandler,
515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) ("And although the government's justification cannot be
mere speculation, it is entitled to rely on 'reasonable predictions of disruption.' (quoting
Waters, 511 U.S. at 673)).
103. See Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
"neither Brewster's First Amendment rights under Pickering nor his procedural due process
rights under Mathews were 'clearly established"').
104. See id. at 977 ("[Brewster] argues that the District's decision not to rehire him on
these bases violated his First Amendment right to free speech.").
105. See id ("Brewster first claims that his nonreelection was in retaliation for his work
as a union grievance representative and his allegations regarding what he believed to be
errors in the school's attendance-accounting practices."). Brewster said that he reported the
allegedly erroneous attendance records because "'changing attendance records was very
important because they affect the [Average Daily Attendance] and therefore the amount of
federal funding received."' Id. at 975.
106. See id. at 978 ("'In evaluating the First Amendment rights of a public employee,
the threshold inquiry is whether the statements at issue substantially address a matter of
public concern."' (citations omitted)); supra Part II.A-B (outlining the two threshold
inquiries-public concern and pursuant to official duty).
107. Brewster, 149 F.3d at 979.
108. See supra Part I1I.B. 1 (discussing the line of Ninth Circuit cases that require a
showing of real, not imagined, disruption to trigger the Pickering balancing test).
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"need not allege that an employee's expression actually disrupted the
workplace.""' 9
The Ninth Circuit defended the use of the less-than-actual disruption
standard applied in Brewster by attempting to show that cases requiring
actual disruption are whistleblowing cases. 10 Although some cases that
explicitly require actual disruption do concern whistleblowing,"' this
distinction does not extend to every case in which the Ninth Circuit has
called for actual disruption.' 12 In McKinley v. City of Eloy,"' for example,
the Ninth Circuit required actual disruption in a case involving speech
criticizing a municipal policy decision not to raise salaries of police
officers."1 4 Although this criticism raised public concerns," 5 McKinley did
109. Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Moreover, public
employers need not allege that an employee's expression actually disrupted the workplace;
'reasonable predictions of disruption' are sufficient." (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion))).
110. See Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing a Ninth
Circuit case in which actual injury was required from the facts of the present case). The
Ninth Circuit justified the requirement of actual injury which was lacking in the Voigt case
by reasoning:
Johnson is readily distinguishable. .... Johnson's statements regarding criminal
misuse of public funds, wastefulness, and inefficiency in managing, and
operating government entities were matters of inherent public concern .... We
held that the employer had to show more than mere disruption of office
relationships. We reasoned that the employer had to show actual injury to its
legitimate interests in order to prevail under the Pickering test. An employer
does not have "a legitimate interest in covering up mismanagement or corruption
and cannot justify retaliation against whistleblowers as a legitimate means of
avoiding the disruption that necessarily accompanies such exposure."
Id (citing Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 425-27 (9th Cir. 1995)).
111. See Johnson, 48 F.3d at 427 (explaining that the County must show "actual injury
to its legitimate interests" and that the County does not have "a legitimate interest in
covering up mismanagement or corruption and cannot justify retaliation against
whistleblowers").
112. See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the
requirement of real, not imagined, disruption in a case where the speech was criticizing the
City's compensation policies for the police).
113. See id at 1115 (agreeing that the "[Flirst [A]mendment protected plaintiff against
discharge for the type of speech in which he engaged").
114. See id at 1115 (requiring real, not imagined, disruption where a police officer
criticized the rate of compensation of the city's police force).
115. See id at 1114 (finding that the public employee speech at issue involved matters
of public concern). The Ninth Circuit explained the connection between the officer's
criticism and public concern by stating:
First, compensation levels undoubtedly affect the ability of the city to attract and
retain qualified police personnel, and the competency of the police force is
surely a matter of great public concern. Second, the interrelationship between
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not raise allegations of corruption or wrongdoing associated with the
decision not to grant pay raises.'1 A mere criticism of a budget decision,
without more, does not constitute whistleblowing, at least in the sense
contemplated by the Ninth Circuit."' 7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's attempt to
explain the inconsistencies by distinguishing among purposes underlying
the expression does not fully address the conflicts.
3. General Trends and Analysis from Ninth Circuit Cases
Similar to the results found in the Eighth Circuit analysis, actual
disruption cases in the Ninth Circuit tend to result in a ruling in favor of the
employee'" 8 while less-than-actual disruption cases tend to result in rulings
favoring the public employer."19 These results-while admittedly, not
city management and its employees is closely connected with "discipline and
morale in the workplace"-factors that "are related to an agency's efficient
performance of its duties."
Id. (citations omitted).
116. See id at 1112 (discussing McKinley's speech in which he protested for a pay
raise). The Ninth Circuit recited the three instances in which McKinley criticized the
compensation decision:
On July 24, 1978, plaintiff attended an Eloy city council meeting to protest the
council's decision not to give police officers their annual raise. Eloy's Mayor,
Robert Facio, told plaintiff to "shut up and sit down' and adjourned the meeting.
Later that evening plaintiff was permitted to speak at a second session, but the
council refuised to respond to the issues he raised. The next day plaintiff was
interviewed by a Phoenix television station regarding the dispute between the
City of Eloy and its police officers.
Id.
117. See Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) ("An employer does not
have 'a legitimate interest in covering up mismanagement or corruption and cannot justify
retaliation against whistleblowers as a legitimate means of avoiding the disruption that
necessarily accompanies such exposure."'). McKinley did not allege corruption or covering
up mismanagement, but rather criticized a policy, the terms of which were available to the
public. See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
McKinley "publicly criticized the City's decision not to give police officers an annual
raise").
118. See Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that Nunez's
speech was "constitutionally protected under the Pickering balancing test"); McKinley, 705
F.2d at 1116 (holding that the public employee "engaged in [F] irst tAlmendment conduct for
which he could not be dismissed"); Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d 503, 516
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Settlegoode's speech was protected and that she was entitled to
damages). These cases required either a real, not imagined, standard of disruption or a
showing of actual injury to the workplace. See supra note 92 (discussing the actual
disruption standard in Nunez, McKinley, and Settlegoode).
119. See Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that
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demonstrating correlation-do strengthen the arguments discussed in Part
III.A.3 concerning the role that deference and lesser burdens play in
determining outcomes.12 0  Because this inconsistent standard has a
significant effect on the level of protection enjoyed by public employees,
these cases demonstrate the need for the Supreme Court or Congress to
articulate a uniform and clear disruption standard for the lower courts to
follow.'
2'
IV Case Law Application of Pickering Balancing to Blogging
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the application of the
Pickering balancing test in the context of employee blogging, litigation
regarding employee expression via the Internet is beginning to develop in
the lower courts.122  In the district court cases discussed infra, an actual
workplace disruption was clear.'123 For these cases, the distinctions between
which standard was applied made no difference to the outcome of the case
because the stricter standard of actual disruption was present. Regardless of
the effect the standard plays in the outcome of each case, the disruption
standard conveyed by the courts is unclear and inconsistent.124 These lower
'the City could discipline [Dible] for those activities without violating his First Amendment
rights'); Brewster v. Bd of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 982 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "no
official violated any of Brewster's clearly established First Amendment rights"); Voigt v.
Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1557 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "an application of the balancing test
articulated in Pickering. ... leads us to conclude that Voigt's speech is not entitled to
constitutional protection" (citations omnitted)). The Ninth Circuit applied a less-than-actual
disruption standard in each of these cases. See supra note 102 (explaining how reasonable
predictions of disruption could satisfy the disruption standard in Brewster and Dible); supra
note 1 10 (explaining how less than actual injury was required in Voigt).
120. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the tone of deference
given to government decision making in Waters and examining the effect of presumptions
and inferences on burdens).
121. See infra Part V.C (discussing the need for the Supreme Court to articulate a clear
and consistent standard of disruption to address the lower court inconsistencies).
122. See Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 576-78 (M.D.
Pa. 2009) (applying the Pickering balancing test to an employee's off-duty blog entries
discussing her personal views about topics related to her work as a hearing officer);
Richerson v. Beckon, No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27,
2008), ajffd, 337 Fed. App'x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the Pickering balancing test
to an employee's off-duty blog entries about her co-workers).
123. See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing the nature of the blogs in Stengle and
Richerson).
124. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing the disruption standard
in Stengle); infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing the disruption standard in
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court blogging cases demonstrate the difficulties of applying the traditional
Pickering framework to the blogging context and sufficiently illustrate the
critical need for Supreme Court or congressional action.
A. Stengle. A Clear Case of Disruption through Compromising
Impartiality
While explicitly setting a potential disruption standard, the court in
Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution125  emphasized factors that
demonstrated the employee's actual disruption in concluding that her
speech was not protected-suggesting that the court may, in practice,
require more than potential disruption. In Stengle, the employee, Stengle,
was a special education due process hearing officer. 126 She had a blog "in
which she regularly discussed special education issues." 22' After discovery
of her blog led to complaints about her ability to remain impartial, the
Office of Dispute Resolution (ODR) chose not to reappoint Stengle as a
hearing officer.12 8 Upon refusal to reappoint, Stengle was provided with the
following justifications:
(1) Plaintiff's blog constituted "advocacy," which ultimately
compromised her ability to serve as an impartial hearing officer; (11) in
refuising to recuse herself in one matter and using intemperate and
inappropriate language in denying the recusal motion; and (111) Plaintiff
failed to 19comply with timeliness requirements in rendering her
opinions.
One of Stengle's several claims alleged that her First Amendment rights
were violated when she was denied reappointment due to the content of her
blog. 13 0 To analyze the First Amendment claim, the district court examined
Richerson).
125. See Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (holding that because Stengle's blog "posed a legitimate threat to the efficient
operation of the due process system," Stengle's "firee speech rights could be constitutionally
abridged under the extant circumstances, and she has thus not suffered a deprivation of those
rights as afforded under the First Amendment").
126. See id at 568 ("At all times relevant to the instant action, Plaintiff Stengle was an
independent contractor who entered into consecutive yearly contracts.").
127. id. at 569.
128. See id. at 571-72 ("Defendant Smith ultimately followed Frankhouser's [legal]
advice when . .. she sent Plaintiff a letter notify'ing Plaintiff that her contract as a hearing
officer was non-renewed.").
129. Id. at 572.
130. See id. at 573 ("Plaintiff has lodged the following counts and allegations in her
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the case in light of the Pickering framework. 13'1 First, the court found that
Stengle had satisfied the burden to prove that she did not write her blog
pursuant to her official duties.312 The court then found that the government
conceded that Stengle's speech touched upon a matter of public concern.1
33
With the two threshold requirements met, the court then proceeded to
balance Stengle's free speech interests with the ODR's interest in
workplace efficiency.134  The court found that the ODR had a legitimate
interest because the blog discussed matters that came before Stengle as a
hearing officer. 135  Moreover, attorneys and parents brought up concerns
about Stengle's impartiality.' 3 6 Because the "blog posed a legitimate threat
to the efficient operation of the due process system," the court found that
the ODR's interest outweighed Stengle's interest; thus, her speech was not
protected by the First Amendment.1
3 7
The controlling factor in this case was whether the content of Stengle's
blog had the potential to disrupt the workplace environment.138 According
to the court, the government demonstrated potential disruption, which
meant the speech was not protected.13 9 Although the court seems to set the
standard at potential disruption in this case,140 the government produced
Second Amended Complaint: (1) violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . .").
131. See id. at 574 (applying the facts of Stengle's case to the elements of the Pickering
balancing test).
132. See id at 575 ("In light of these contentions, we believe that the Plaintiff has
adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she was not maintaining
her blog in her official capacity as a hearing officer.").
133. See jd ("ODR Defendants concede that Plaintiff's speech was a matter of public
concern.").
134. See id ("[S]o we consider whether Plaintiff's interest in her speech outweighs
ODR's interest in promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption.").
135. See id at 570 (finding that while writing her blog entries, "Stengle relied on her
experiences as a hearing officer and in the special education industry, which engendered
discussions involving Gaskin issues and other legal issues with which she was confronted in
her capacity as a hearing officer").
136. See id. (discussing complaints against Stengle from various sources).
137. Idat 577.
138. See id ("The Supreme Court has stated that in order to pass constitutional muster,
restrictions on free speech must be 'directed at speech that has some potential to affect the
entities' operations."' (citations omitted)).
139. See id ("From these facts, one can readily infer that Plaintiff's blog had the
potential to induce recusal motions from those who came before her in her hearing officer
capacity. .... In either instance, governmental efficiency would be adversely affected.").
140. See id. ("[T]he government need not point to actual disruptiveness in order for its
conduct to he rendered constitutional.... Plaintiff would be obliged to show that the
conduct in question, her blogging activities, had no potential to disrupt government
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sufficient evidence to demonstrate the actual disruption created by
Stengle's blogging activities.'14' If the facts had been slightly different and
the effects of the blog not as clear, it is debatable whether the court would
have adhered to the potential disruption standard. The passive nature of a
blog entry written outside of the workplace suggests that any showing less
than actual disruption would involve a very subjective determination that
would be difficult to demonstrate. Given that the extent of disruption in
Stengle's case was relatively concrete, the distinction between potential and
actual disruption likely did not play a role in the finding of disruption; '
42
however, the issue will resurface in future blogging cases where disruption
is less concrete.
B. Richerson: Demonstrating Ninth Circuit Confusion over Disruption
Richerson v. Beckon143 is another case in which a court applied the
Pickering balancing test to employee blogging activities. In Richerson, the
Ninth Circuit held that the content of Richerson's blog, which included
"ivituperative" comments about her employer, did not warrant First
Amendment protections under the Pickering balancing test.'"4 Richerson, a
curriculum director for the Central Kitsap School District, posted a personal
blog entry in which she commented on the qualifications of the person hired
to assume duties that she had previously held.'14 1 When district
operations. ").
141. See id. (discussing how Stengle's blog "had the potential to raise questions as to
her impartiality" while also noting the actual complaints received by outside attorneys
regarding Stengle's blog).
142. See, e.g., id at 570 ("A parent involved in the litigation of a case that was to go
before a hearing officer stated that after review of Plaintiff's blog, she did not want Plaintiff
to be the hearing officer in her case because she doubted Plaintiffs ability to maintain
impartiality.").
143. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 Fed. App'x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2009) (deciding that
"the district court did not err in concluding that the legitimate administrative interests of the
School District outweighed Richerson's First Amendment interests in not being transferred
because of her speech").
144. See id. at 638 ("We nevertheless affirm the summary judgment because
Richerson's transfer was appropriate under the balancing test laid out in Pickering....
Richerson's publicly-available blog included several highly personal and vituperative
comments about her employers, union representatives, and fellow teachers." (citations
omitted)).
145. See Richerson v. Beckon, No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 27, 2008), af'd, 337 Fed. App'x 637 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the content of
Richerson's blog entries). The court included the following blog entry entitled "Save us
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administration officials became aware of the blog entry, they verbally
reprimanded Richerson. 146  After discovery of a subsequent blog entry,
which sharply criticized the chief negotiator of the teacher's union,
Richerson was reassigned from her position as curriculum director and
instructional coach to classroom teacher.1
47
In conducting the Pickering analysis, the court first assumed that
Richerson's speech was a matter of public concern.148  The court then
analyzed Richerson's First Amendment interests and the government's
interest as employer.14 9  The court determined that the position of
instructional coach required Richerson to enter into trusting mentor
relationships with less experienced teachers-at least one of whom refused
to work with Richerson after reading the blog.' 50  For these reasons, the
White Boy!" to demonstrate the vituperative nature of Richerson's comments:
I met with the new me today: the person who will take my summer work and
make it a full-time year-round position. I was on the interview conmnittee for
this job and this guy was my third choice ... and a reluctant one at that. I truly
hope that I have to eat my words about this guy.... But after spending time
with this guy today, I think Boss Lady 2.0 made the wrong call in hiring
him. .... He comes across as a smug know-it-all creep. And that's probably the
nicest way I can describe him .... He has a reputation of crapping on
secretaries and not being able to finish tasks on his own.... And he's white.
And male. I know he can't help that, but I think the District would have done
well to recruit someone who has other connections to the community...
Mighty White Boy looks like he's going to crash and burn.
Id
146. See id. ("[D]efendant Jeanne Beckon (Executive Director of Human Service for
the school district) met with plaintiff, confirmed the source of the blog entry, and verbally
reprimanded plaintiff for violating the confidentiality expected of a member of an employee
interview team.").
147. See id ("The blog entry of concern to Brown was critical of the Central Kitsap
Education Association (teachers' union). It included the following statement: 'What I
wouldn't give to draw a little Hitler mustache on the chief negotiator."').
148. See Richerson, 337 Fed. App'x at 638 ("We assume, without deciding, that at least
some of Richerson's speech was of public concern.").
149. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 Fed. App'x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (examining the
effect of Richerson's speech on the efficiency of the workplace). The Ninth Circuit
reasoned:
It is abundantly clear from undisputed evidence in the record that Richerson's
speech had a significantly deleterious effect. . ... Beckon provided testimony,
not controverted by Richerson, indicating that several individuals refused to
work with Richerson in the future. Common sense indicates that few teachers
would expect that they could enter into a confidential and trusting relationship





court found that Richerson's "blog had fatally undermined her ability to
enter into trusting relationships as an instructional coach."' 5' The Ninth
Circuit decided that the "district court did not err in concluding that the
legitimate administrative interests of the School District outweighed
Richerson's First Amendment interests in not being transferred because of
her speech."152
A thorough examination of the court's reasoning in Richerson exposes
the Ninth Circuit's genuine confusion over the disruption standard and
demonstrates why the Supreme Court should clarify this test. In the initial
opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that the government had the burden of
showing a "reasonable prediction" of disruption.513 However, this decision
was subsequently amended to delete the passage referring to the
"reasonable prediction" standard and replace it with a passage referring to
the "actual injury" to the school district.'514  Although the Ninth Circuit
found that Richerson's blog content was not protected under either
disruption standard, the fact that the court deleted the reference to the
reasonable prediction passage seems to reflect the court's acknowledgement
of Richerson's argument that the government has the burden of proving
actual disruption and not merely potential disruption. As discussed in Part
III.B, the Ninth Circuit decisions are inconsistent on this point. While some
cases allow potential disruption to trigger Pickering balancing, the Ninth
Circuit has required a showing of actual injury to the government in other
cases.'15 5  These conflicting standards explain the confusion the Ninth
Circuit exhibited in this recent case.
15 1. Id.
152. Id. at 639.
153. See Order at 1, Richerson v. Beckon, No. 08-35310, slip. op. (9th Cir. Aug. 27,
2009), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/200908/27/08-
3531 Ooa.pdf ("[Dielete the following passage: Beckon need only make a 'reasonable
prediction' that such disruption would occur; she need not demonstrate that it has occurred
or will occur to a certainty. This standard was clearly met." (citations omitted)).
154. See id. at 2 ("[Slubstitute the following: This uncontroverted testimony therefore
demonstrates an actual injury to the school's legitimate interests." (citing Settlegoode v.
Portland Public Schools, 3 71 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 2004))).
155. Compare Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Moreover,
public employers need not allege that an employee's expression actually disrupted the
workplace; 'reasonable predictions of disruption' are sufficient." (citations omitted)), with
Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Sch., 371 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
magistrate judge failed to find actual injury to the school district).
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C. Lessons Gleaned From Blogging Cases
Both Stengle and Richerson involved blog content that specifically
interfered with each employee's ability to fully perform her job. In Stengle,
impartiality was a requirement for a hearing officer,' 56 and in Richerson, the
ability to be trusted was a key quality necessary to being an effective
instructional coach.' The direct and negative impact that the blogs in
these cases had on the efficiency of the workplace demonstrates why
interest balancing is important. 5 8 Regardless of the disruption standard
applied, the interest in having employees who can fully perform their
official duties should outweigh the limited First Amendment interests
involved in these cases. However, if the facts in these cases were changed
slightly and the speech was not related directly to the employee's ability to
perform effectively, the difference between actual and potential disruption
would be significant. Thus, as cases with more difficult facts reach the
courts, it will be important to have a firm standard in place to give this new
and important form of expression adequate protection. 159
V Recommendations: Actual Disruption Should Be Required
As Oliver Wendell Holmes so aptly wrote, "a legal duty so called is
nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be
made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;-and so of a
legal right."' 60 The ability to predict how the law will treat different types
of expression is necessary to the protection of the First Amendment.'16 '1 As
156. See Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (noting that a bearing officer is "required to be impartial').
157. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 Fed. App'x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that
"the positions from which Richerson was transferred required that she enter into trusting
mentor relationships with other, less experienced teachers in order for her to give honest,
critical, and private feedback").
158. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("At the same time it
cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general.").
159. See Lauren B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424,
1435 (1962) (discussing the role that definer judges can play in creating lines for
constitutional tests).
160. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897).
161. See, e.g., id. at 457 ("The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.").
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the foregoing discussion reveals, under the current public employee free
speech doctrine, the ability to predict what speech will be protected is
flawed due to the confusion regarding what standard of disruption is
necessary.16 2  Blogging is a unique form of expression that efficiently
serves the purposes of the classic free speech rationales.16 3 Because of the
continuing expansion of blogging and the useful purposes for which it
serves, the Supreme Court must adopt the actual disruption standard to
more adequately protect this type of speech. Alternatively, due to the
importance of the blog as a vehicle for expression, Congress should
intervene by enacting a statute designed to protect the electronic
communications of public employees. Either of these suggestions or the
combination will be a positive step to ensure the First Amendment rights of
public employees are fully protected.
A. Blogging Implicates the Classic Free Speech Theories
An examination of the theories and rationales underlying the First
Amendment reveals the importance of protecting speech and expressive
conduct in general, while also highlighting the reasons why the unique
nature of blogging and other electronic communications deserves protection
under the First Amendment. The three classic free speech theories are
typically referred to as "the marketplace of ideas," "human dignity and self-
fulfillment," and "democratic self-governance."'64 This section explores the
classic rationales underlying free speech theory and examines the role these
theories play in the public employee blogging context.
1. Marketplace of Ideas
By breaking down geographic and economic barriers, the blog is an
extremely efficient conduit for the marketplace of ideas.' 65  The
162. See supra Part III (describing the lower court inconsistencies regarding the
disruption standard).
163. See infra Part V.A (discussing how blogging implicates the classic free speech
rationales).
164. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, I SMOLLA & NUimmER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3, at 2-
3 (2010) [hereinafter SMOLLA 1] (explaining the classic free speech theories).
165. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 327 ("Whatever the outcome of each of our
individual bets, we can now see that collectively they constitute something unprecedented in
human history: a new kind of public sphere, at once ephemeral and timeless, sharing the
characteristics of conversation and deliberation.").
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marketplace of ideas rationale is often associated with Justice Holmes's
dissent in Abrams v. United States. 166 Justice Holmes articulated this theory
by reasoning:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.... While
that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. 6
This theory acknowledges that humans have a tendency to suppress
viewpoints with which they disagree, but, Holmes argues, the best way to
reach the ultimate truth is through the open competition of opposing
viewpoints.16 8 While the established exceptions to the First Amendment are
not protected under the marketplace theory,169 less dangerous speech that
does not fit an exception warrants protection.1
70
166. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (finding that the
defendants were not entitled to First Amendment protections for their speech); Robert Post,
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 157 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R.
Stone eds., 2002) ("Instead, [Holmes] proposed the now-famous theory of the marketplace
of ideas....)
167. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
168. See MATTHEw D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2-8 (2001), for a discussion of the
development of the marketplace theory in First Amendment law.
169. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (describing the
classes of speech that deserve no protection under the First Amendment). Justice Murphy
wrote:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words--those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. Cf BUNKER, supra note 168, at 6 (describing John Stuart Mill's influence on the
marketplace of ideas theory and specifically, how he "purported to show that whether an
unpopular view is true, partially true, or entirely false, it should not be suppressed").
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Understanding this theory as one that protects the structure of the
marketplace, it is easy to see how the blog uniquely facilitates a free and
open exchange. The marketplace of ideas theory is best understood as a
"defense of the process of the open marketplace" and not as a theory
guaranteeing the ultimate truth.'17 ' From the perspective of process, the
blog is uniquely tailored to accommodate the exchange of opposing
viewpoints.172  Concededly, many entries on blogs are trivial at best;1
7 1
however, under the marketplace of ideas theory, the process that allows for
the free exchange of ideas is what matters most, and society is essentially
willing to take the bad with the good.'
714
Although the Court has recognized that government employee speech
is only given limited First Amendment protections,175  the theories
underlying the First Amendment must remain a driving consideration in
applying the balancing method. Commenting on the power of Holmes's
dissent, Dean Robert Post notes that "[b]y tightening the constitutionally
required connection between speech and action in this way, Holmes sought
both to provide ample room for the functioning of the marketplace of ideas
and to empower the state to regulate speech when it was sufficiently close
to causing prohibitable substantive evils."716  A similar tightening of the
connection between "speech" on blogs and "action" in terms of disruption
to the workplace follows Holmes's marketplace of ideas reasoning.
Because of the immense number of blogs in existence and the wide range of
topics they cover,'717 the application of Holmes' s reasoning from Abrams
17 1. SMOLLA 1, supra note 164, § 2:19, at 2-1 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
537 (1945)).
172. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 326 (" [Olf all the species of writer, bloggers are
the least insulated from their audience, most vulnerable to the ebb and flow of attention and
response.").
173. See id at 304 ("Individually, blogs, like 'unnecessary' quotation marks are mere
diversions.").
174. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987) ("But the First Amendment
recognizes, wisely we think, that a certain amount of expressive disorder not only is
inevitable in a society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that
freedom would survive."); SMOLLA 1, supra note 164, § 2:20, at 2-19 ("One of the
consequences of an open marketplace, of course, is that society must at times tolerate the
volatility and disorder that all open markets will occasionally produce." (citations omitted)).
175. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563. 568 (1968) ("[Ilt cannot be gainsaid
that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with the regulation of the speech of
the citizenry in general.").
176. Post, supra note 166, at 159-60.
177. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 311 ("All these developments together fueled the
phenomenal growth in sheer numbers that blogging continued to experience as the first
185
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warrants a heightened protection of public employee speech on blogs. This
can be achieved by "tightening" the disruption standard and requiring actual
disruption as opposed to potential disruption. Such a shift will more
adequately protect the process necessary for a free marketplace of ideas by
preventing unnecessary chilling of electronic speech by public employees
due to fear produced by the uncertainties of the balancing test.1
78
2. Democratic Self-Governance
While not always implicated in the blogging activities of public
employees, the theory of democratic self-governance does play a
heightened role in the context of public employment speech, and the
medium of blogging can go a long way in quickly disseminating this
information.17 9 From the outset, it is important to note that understanding
this theory as the exclusive rationale underlying the First Amendment
would greatly reduce the constitutional protections for content on public
employee blogs; however, the theory must be considered alongside the
other classic First Amendment theories. 180 After accepting democratic self-
governance as an addition to the body of First Amendment theory, it
follows that the rationales underlying this concept also support a firmer
disruption standard for blogging. 1
8 1
decade of the 2000s wore on. A March 2008 study by Universal McCann found that 184
million people worldwide had started a blog . .. ."); id at 315 ("The success of blogging at a
scale of millions has ensured that voices at each end of this spectrum, and at every point in
between, will always find a wealth of supporting examples for their cases.").
178. See Frantz, supra note 159, at 1443 (discussing how the ad hoc balancing test
"fails to give effective encouragement" to free speech and how many "will be deterred
merely by the pervasive and ineradicable uncertainty" associated with these ad hoc balancing
tests).
179. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 312-13 (discussing the "milbloggers" in
Iraq, which are "legions of Americans in uniform on tours of duty posting about their
frustrations and small triumphs, their fears and doubts"). One "milbiogger" aptly expressed
the importance of democratic self-governance in a blog post by stating, "[ilf there is any
hope for the long term success of democracy, it will be if people agree to listen to and try to
understand their political opponents rather than simply seeking to crush them .. . ." Id. at
313; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 135 (discussing the "potential for constructive and
spontaneous group action" that can be sparked through online forms of communication).
180. See SMOLLA 1, supra note 164, § 2:36, at 2-39 ("[A] principal guiding thesis of this
treatise is that it is far better to understand the self-governance rationale as one of many
arguments that, in combination, provide an overwhelmingly compelling case for heightened
constitutional protection for freedom of speech.").
181. See REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 131 (discussing the pressure that "horizontal
knowledge," achieved through blogging, can place on governments).
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The self-governance theory suggests that the First Amendment
protects the free and open exchange necessary to a democratic society.
1 2
Narrower than the marketplace of ideas theory, the democratic self-
governance theory focuses primarily on political speech. 183 One conception
of this theory is that the First Amendment protects the ability for citizens to
communicate and disseminate ideas and viewpoints relevant to the voting
process.184 Justice Brandeis's "tsafety-valve"t rationale from his concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California 185 can also be included under this
theory.'186 The safety valve rationale recognizes the importance of giving all
voices in a democracy--especially the minority voice-an outlet for
expression to encourage stability. 11Where the need for a safety valve
182. See BUNKER, supra note 168, at 8 ("Alexander Meiklejohn, perhaps the leading
proponent of the self-government theory, argued that the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment was the means by which democracy functioned.").
183. See id at 8-9 ("The speech protected by the First Amendment, Meiklejohn argued,
was speech aimed at enhancing citizen participation in political issues.").
184. See Post, supra note 166, at 165 ("The First Amendment is understood to protect
the communicative processes necessary to disseminate the information and ideas required
for citizens to vote in a fully informed and intelligent way.').
185. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that "[nior is the Syndicalism Act as applied in this
case repugnant to the due process clause as a restraint of the rights of free speech, assembly,
and association").
186. See id at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of free speech
as a 'path of safety"). Justice Brandeis explained why the founders created the right to free
speech:
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. See SMOLLA 1, supra note 164, § 2:35, at 2-38 ("[The democratic process will on
occasion produce majority decisions that squelch the speech of the minority. When this
conflict of values occurs, a society will be both more stable and more free in the long run if
openness values prevail.'); see also Paula A. Monopoli & Manin R. Scordato, Free Speech
Rationales After September 11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center
America, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 199 (2002) (discussing a recent interpretation of the
safety valve rationale in the "the post-September 11I environment"). Scordato and Monopoli
reasoned that:
Some might argue that allowing citizens to express their anger and grief may act
to release such emotions and may in fact minimize the rise of ethnic violence
against those in society who are of the same ethnic origins as the terrorists who
flew planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field.
187
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exists, the blog will allow many people to express themselves quickly and
efficiently.18 8
In terms of public employee speech, the Court has recognized a form
of heightened protection for some political speech in the form of a sliding
scale approach regarding the extent to which the speech touches on a matter
of public concern.189  However, a firm standard of actual disruption for
blogs would more uniformly protect all forms of political speech. This
theory does have added protections under the Pickering balancing test in
that political speech will typically touch on a higher level of public
concern.' 90 A firmer disruption standard, however, will ensure that all
forms of political speech are given equal protection when weighed against
the government's interests.
3. Human Dignity and Self-Fulllment
The broadest of the three theories-human dignity and self-
fulfillment-looks at "freedom of speech as an end in itself."' 9' Under this
theory, self-expression is viewed as an essential component of individual
liberty.192 Self-expression and the ability to hear the expression of others is
associated with happiness and self-realization, and thus, restrictions on
speech are viewed as inhibiting self-realization.193
Id
188. See, for example, REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 121, for a discussion of the power of
"horizontal knowledge," which is an important form of expression that internet
communications such as blogging permit. Reynolds explained that "[hlorizontal knowledge
is communication among individuals, who may or may not know each other, but who are
loosely coordinated by their involvement with something, or someone, of mutual interest.
And it's extremely powerful, because it makes people much stronger." Id.
189. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (explaining that there is no need
"for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office .. , is
manifest," but cautioning "that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern").
190. See, e.g., EDWARDS, LEKA, BAIRD & BLACK, supra note 9, at 53-54 ("Courts
almost always find that employee speech related to the political process addresses a matter
of public concern.... When a public employer disciplines an employee for political speech,
courts react harshly, often characterizing such action as a 'coercion of belief."' (citations
omitted)).
19 1. SMOLLA 1, supra note 164, § 2:2 1, at 2-22.
192. See BUNKER, supra note 168, at 11I ("[T]he individual autonomy theory holds that
free speech is an important component of individual liberty, regardless of its products.").
193. See id at 12 ("Human beings cannot develop their humanity or, in a slightly
different formulation, achieve self-realization under a regime that restricts freedom of
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Blogs are uniquely able to accommodate self-expression and self-
realization.194  Some of the drawbacks to self-expression that come with
other forms of speech are eliminated with the blog. For example, in writing
a novel or an article for a newspaper, the barriers of publication and limited
space often prevent the average person from access to these avenues. 95
Similarly, although the simple act of speaking to express one's self is
accessible to most in that there are no monetary, professional, or
educational barriers to simply speaking, this form of expression also comes
with limitations. If self-realization is dependent on being able to express
oneself to an audience, the pure ability to speak will not always be as
effective as the ability to reach an audience unhindered by geographic
boundaries. 16Furthermore, some people cannot gain the same type of
fulfillment by spoken word that they can achieve through the act of writing
for an audience.19 7 Thus, blogging opens an avenue for self-expression for
situations where more traditional forms of expression cannot fully
accommodate a speaker. 98 Placing the burden on the government to prove
that off-duty blogs cause actual disruption before taking retaliatory action
furthers this theory. If blogging is a person's avenue of choice for self-
expression, then an unpredictable haphazard standard would deter many
from blogging for self-fulfillment out of fear that their thoughts may disturb
a coworker and be used against them.'99
thought and expression.").
194. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 311 ("Blogs are, after all, notable for enabling the
expression of individuality.").
195. But see id at 312 (discussing how a stay-at-home mother of two living in New
Jersey became "one of the best sources of information in the United States about regional
conflicts in Yemen").
196. See, e.g., BUNKER, supra note 168, at 14 (noting that self-fulfillment can be
achieved by both the "citizen as listener, seeking to form her own opinions" and by the
"citizen as speaker, seeking to communicate her view ofjustice, truth, or the good life").
197. See, e.g., id. at 12 (describing the individual autonomy theory by referring to a
scholarly quote recognizing the importance of achieving self-expression through multiple
mediums). Bunker noted: "'As humans, . .. we also need to be able to express openly those
possibilities through words, clothing, dance, decoration, architecture, music, art, literature."'
Id. (quoting ROBERT TRAGER & DONNA L. DICKERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE 2 1ST
CENTURY 101 (1999)).
198. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 326 ("Bloggers, most of them solo
bootstrappers of their own stream of self-expression, are the most autonomous writers the
world has yet seen-the least dependent on others to publish their words.").
199. See Frantz, supra note 159, at 1443 (discussing how uncertainties associated with
balancing tests can prevent or chill speech that would otherwise be protected).
189
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B. Return to Cutler's Blog: Why Actual Disruption Matters
This section reexamines Cutler's blog with a full understanding of the
lack of a predictable disruption standard and the unique ways in which off-
duty blogging implicates the classic First Amendment theories. If Cutler's
blog had been written off-duty, the content could implicate all three classic
theories-suggesting that this is the type of speech that should be protected
in order to have a thriving First Amendment. Cutler's descriptions of
potentially corrupt employment practices are relevant to the democratic
self-governance theory in that these are the types of activities that a voter
would want to know to make a fully informed decision .200 Approaching the
marketplace of ideas theory from the process standpoint, Cutler's ability to
broadcast her experiences working on Capitol Hill contributes to the free
and open exchange of ideas. 20'1 Finally, Cutler's purpose for starting this
blog is essentially the self-fulfillment rationale. 0 Cutler was putting her
life experiences, her emotions, and her feelings on a blog for her close
friends to read-she was expressing herself
203
Because Cutler's blog had value under the First Amendment, her
ability to predict whether she could be retaliated against for her blog
matters under current constitutional doctrine. The disruption standard
would have made a difference in the outcome of a case if Cutler had chosen
to litigate .204 Recognizing the extra protections that should be allotted to
private, off-duty speech, Circuit Judge Sotomayor-now a Supreme Court
Justice-wrote:
The fact that speech takes place in private and away from the workplace
favors the employee on both sides of the balancing test: First, it reduces
the likelihood of disruption. Second, it enhances the free speech
200. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing how free speech protects
the ability of citizens to disseminate information relevant to the voting process).
201. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing the process view of the
open marketplace theory).
202. See Witt, supra note 15, at W12 (describing Cutler as "an American uber-
individualist demanding the right to tell her own story her own way"); supra Part V.A.3
(discussing the human dignity and self-fuilfillment theory).
203. See id. at WI 2 (describing Cutler's blog as "the online diary she had been posting
anonymously to amuse herself and her closest girlfriends").
204. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining how actual disruption could




interests at stake because the employee is speaking in his capacity "as
the member of the general public he seeks to be."
205
Because of the value that personal blogs can add to free expression, it is
imperative that a clear standard exists so that other bloggers in Cutler's
shoes are aware of the consequences and not prevented from expressing
protected speech.
C. The Supreme Court Should Address Prior Inconsistencies and Adopt an
Actual Disruption Standard
In light of the ambiguity associated with the meaning of disruption in
the context of Pickering, the Supreme Court must adopt a clear standard
that lower courts can apply uniformly. Balancing tests, by their very
nature, come with a level of uncertainty in application. 0 Although this
uncertainty is, in ways, viewed positively for providing flexible application
of legal rules to specific facts 207 it is important to maintain firm guidelines
within the tests in order to ensure that rights-particularly constitutional
rights-are adequately protected. 0
The distinction between actual and potential disruption may seem
insignificant at first glance; however, certain types of speech-including
blogs and other electronic communications-are vulnerable where the
standard requires less than actual disruption .209  Although the outcome
differences between potential and actual disruption for speech occurring at
work are less significant, the differences between the two standards become
more pronounced when the speech at issue occurs off-duty and outside the
traditional workplace.
205. Pappas v. Guiliani, 290 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563. 574 (1968)).
206. See, e.g., Frantz, supra note 159, at 1431 (suggesting the uncertainty of balancing
tests in commenting on a Supreme Court announcement of First Amendment balancing).
Frantz questioned: "Does this not say that, even where First Amendment protection 'exists,'
it need not, and often will not, 'prevail'?" Id.
207. See id. at 1427 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's view that balancing was desirable
because of its ability to avoid absolute rules and inflexible dogmas).
208. See id. at 1434 (describing the difference between balancing to adopt a new rule
and balancing to determine the disposition of a case and praising the certainties that come
with the former).
209. See, e.g., supra note 95 (discussing the need for real, not imagined, disruption in
order to prevent restrictions on speech that are solely based on an employer's personal
animus toward an employee).
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The contrast between the majority and dissenting opinions in the Second
Circuit case, Pappas v. Guiiani,210 illustrates the difference the disruption
standard can have on the outcome of a case. In Pappas, Pappas worked in the
computer maintenance department of the New York Police Department .2 1"
Annoyed with receiving letters from the local auxiliary, which solicited
charitable contributions, "Pappas stuffed the reply envelopes with offensive
racially bigoted materials and returned them anonymously. 2 12 After a lengthy
investigation, the police department determined Pappas's identity and eventually
dismissed him for violating an internal police regulation. 1 The majority in
Pappas applied a potential disruption standard and found that the "Department's
reasonable perception of serious likely impairment of its performance of its
mission outweighed Pappas's interest in free speech.",21 1 Circuit Judge
Sotomayor focused on the lack of actual disruption and the off-duty characteristic
of Pappas's speech in dissenting from the majority opinion .215' Both the majority
and dissenting justices in Pappas claimed to apply Supreme Court precedent in
reaching their respective conclusions regarding disruption. 1 Nevertheless,
210. See Pappas, 290 F.3d at 151 (deciding that the 'Department's reasonable
perception of serious likely impairment of its performance of its mission outweighed
Pappas's interest in free speech").
211. See id. at 144 (explaining that "Pappas was employed by the New York City
Police Department" and "worked in the Department's Management Information Systems
Division ... which was responsible for maintenance of its computer systems").
212. Id. at 144-45.
213. See id. at 145 (discussing the investigation and eventual decision to terminate
Pappas).
214. Id. at 151. The majority responded to the dissenting argument by noting that it
was "premised on a misunderstanding of the government's burden under Pickering" and that
the governmental interest in discharging an employee "does not depend on the employer's
having suffered actual harm resulting from the speech." Id.
215. See id. at 154 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the New York Police Department). Circuit Judge Sotomayor
powerfully opened her dissent:
Today the Court enters uncharted terrtory in our First Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court holds that the government does not violate the
First Amendment when it fires a police department employee for racially
inflammatory speech-where. . . the speech occurred away from the
office and on the employee's own time; where the employee's position
involved no policymaking authority or public contact; where there is
virtually no evidence of workplace disruption resulting directly from the
speech; and where it ultimately required the investigatory resources of
two police departments to bring the speech to the attention of the
community.
Id.
216. Compare id at 151 (citing Waters v. Churchill and Connick v. Myers in support of
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Pappas's speech was protected under the actual disruption standard and
outweighed by balancing under the potential disruption standard."' 7
Electronic communications such as blogging are especially vulnerable to
these distinctions between actual and potential disruption. As Part V.A
discussed, these electronic forms of communication are also some of the most
powerful forms of communication in terms of furthering the theories underlying
the First Amendment .2' 8  Because of the importance of electronic forms of
expression and the effect that the disruption standard can have on them, the Court
should clarify that public employers must demonstrate actual disruption.
D. Proposed Federal Statute: A Showing ofActual Disruption is Requiredjor
Public Employment Actions Involving Electronic Communication
Alternatively, Congress should intervene to address the inconsistent and
unpredictable application of the disruption prong. Because of the widespread use
and importance of blogging and other forms of electronic communications,
Congress should draft a law that will create clear standards regarding the extent
of protection that federal employees enjoy when using these resources. By
enacting a statute that requires a showing of actual disruption to the workplace
before a federal employer can take adverse action against an employee for off-
duty electronic communications, Congress can provide a more predictable
standard. Moreover, by setting the standard at actual disruption, Congress may
still defer to interest balancing when the electronic communications cause actual
disruption to the workplace. Admittedly, a Supreme Court adoption of the
disruption standard would apply to all public employers 219 while the proposed
congressional statute's reach would not extend beyond federal employees.
220
a potential disruption standard), with id at 156 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Rankin v.
McPherson in support of the need for a disruption showing).
217. Compare id. at 151 (holding that Pappas's speech was not protected), with id at
154 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that the balancing factors "counsel[] against
granting summary judgment in favor of the police department employer").
218. See supra Part V.A (discussing how blogging uniquely implicates the classic free
speech theories).
219. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (determining that free speech
applies to the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court
stated: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are
among the fu~ndamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id
220. C( City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) exceeded Congress's enforcement power under the
193
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Nevertheless, a congressional statute would at least provide a sense of certainty to
federal employees and may prompt states to adopt similar statutes .22 1 Although
no federal laws specifically address public employee rights with respect to off-
duty electronic communications, statutes governing off-duty conduct of
employees exist in several states .222 Providing the broadest off-duty protections,
a New York statute protects the off-duty "recreational activities" of employees.
223
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). RFRA was a congressional response to
the Supreme Court interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v.
Smith. Id at 512. Congress attempted to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner" through the enactment of RFRA, which was applicable to "all Federal
and State law.' Id. at 515-16. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court emphasized that
Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what
constitutes a constituional violation" under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 519.
Although not directly on point, City of Boerne does shed light on whether Congress could
pass a law that would essentially interpret the First Amendment rights of all public
employees by mandating actual disruption. In light of City of Boerne, it would be highly
unlikely that a congressional statute which attempted to apply this employment standard to
the states would be upheld under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
221. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ('It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). Following from Justice Brandeis's
famous laboratories of democracy theory, the states may choose to experiment with
employee protections by passing slightly different statutes to protect the First Amendment
rights of their public employees.
222. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?:
Limiting the Use of Off- Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 640-69 (2004) (discussing statutory protection of off-duty
conduct in California, New York, North Dakota, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Connecticut).
223. See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2009) (describing protections for
employees from "discrimination against the engagement in certain activities' including
recreational activities). The statute reads:
1 .b. "Recreational activities" shall mean any lawful, leisure-time activity, for
which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally engaged
in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies,
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material ...
2. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any employer or
employment agency to refuse to hire, employ or license, or to discharge from
employment or otherwise discriminate against an individual in compensation,
promotion or terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of.. . c. an
individual's legal recreational activities outside work hours, off of the
employer's premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other
property; or ... 3. The provisions of subdivision two of this section shall not be
deemed to protect activity which: a. creates a material conflict of interest related
to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or other proprietary or
business interest; . .. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision three of
this section, an employer shall not be in violation of this section where the
employer takes action based on the belief either that: (i) the employer's actions
1194
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The stability and power of prediction that come from this state statute should be
incorporated in a feder-al statute tailored to protect electronic communications.
This Note proposes the following text for a federal statute:
Federal Government Employee Protections from Retaliatory Acton for
Electronic Communications
(a) Prohibited Action
Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawflal for any federal
government employer to discharge from employment, or otherwise take
adverse action against an individual in compensation, promotion, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of an individual's off-duty
electronic communications.
(b) Limitations
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), the federal govemnment
employer shall not be in violation of this section when the employer
demonstrates a showing of actual disruption to the workplace caused by the
off-duty electronic communications.
(c) Definitions
"Off-duty" means conducted outside work hours, off of the employer's
premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property.
"Electronic communications" means any speech expressed through use of the
Internet including but not limited to blogging, social networking, and postings
on discussion boards.
VI. Conclusion
Blogging and other types of electronic communication are continuously
evolving into widely used forms of expression. 12 The growth of blogging will
were required by statute, regulation, ordinance or other governmental mandate,
(ii) the employer's actions were permissible pursuant to an established substance
abuse or alcohol program or workplace policy, professional contract or
collective bargaining agreement, or (iii) the individual's actions were deemed by
an employer or previous employer to be illegal or to constitute habitually poor
performance, incompetency or misconduct.
Id While not specifically listed, off-duty blogging could fall under the "recreational
activities" category of this law. The limitations on the protections found in § 201 -d(3)-(4)
recognize the interests of the employer while also creating predictable standards for when
the employer can take actions against the employee. Id at § 201 -d(3)-(4).
224. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 302 ("It has taken blogging roughly a decade to
evolve from the pursuit of a handful of enthusiasts on the finges of the technology industry
into the dominant media form online.").
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lead to an increase in litigation regarding this evolving form of expression, and
public employee blogging cases will play a significant role in defining the
boundaries of free speech rights .22s The blog serves the classic theories
underlying the First Amendment in ways that other forms of speech cannot. The
special role that the blog plays in facilitating the First Amendment supports the
need for clear guidelines defining what types of speech on blogs are protected in
order to prevent unnecessary chilling.
Blogs are especially vulnerable in the employment context. Written outside
of the workplace and often of a personal nature, the off-duty public employee
blog is particularly susceptible to manipulation in the context of the Pickering
balancing test.22 By deferring to the governmental interest in promoting
efficiency, the disruption prong-depending on the standard-can provide an
opportunity for a public employer to embellish the effects of an employee's blog
by imagining some sort of potential disruption that the employee may not have
foreseen at the time of writing.22 One way to increase the protections given to
public employee blogs is to tighten the standards under the Pickering balancing
test. By applying the actual disruption standard uniformly to all public employee
blogging cases, the Supreme Court will prevent unnecessary chilling of this
valuable form of speech. Altemnatively, Congress should legislatively mandate
an actual disruption standard for the electronic communications of federal
employees. Creating a firm actual disruption standard is one incremental step
that will provide more certainty and reduce the chilling effect associated with the
uncertain balancing test. Combined with the value of consistency, this change
will be a significant step in the direction of ensuring that the First Amendment
rights of public employees for off-duty electronic communications are adequately
protected.
225. See, e.g., Todd et. al., supra note 8 ("In 2006, the Employment Law Alliance
surveyed over 1,000 American employees and found that up to five percent maintained
personal blogs. Of them, 16 percent admitted to posting unfavorable comments about their
employers, co-workers, supervisors, or customers.").
226. See supra note 56 (discussing the vulnerability of blogs under Pickering due to
their personal nature).
227. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of a real, not
imagined, disruption standard to prevent employers from covering up a personal animus
toward an employee through a claim of disruption).
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